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LEGAL PROBLEMS IN TAXING INCOME FROM
GOVERNMENTAL SECURITIES
ELmx. E. RouzW.
President Roosevelt, in his message to Congress of April 25, 1938, and again on
January i9, 1939, urged Congress to tax the interest from future issues of state bonds,
and to authorize the states to tax the interest from future issues of federal bonds1
The conflicting reactions to the constitutionality of this proposal are evidenced by the
fact that the Department of Justice2 and the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation,3 after making comprehensive studies of the subject and examining the same
cases, came to opposite conclusions.
I. THE DocrrmN OF IN-R(GovEK MENTAL IhomNrrm
The legal difficulties with respect to the taxation of the interest from govern-
mental securities arise from the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities. That
doctrine, the outgrowth of McCulloch v. Maryland,4 which found a federal im-
munity from state taxation, and Collector v. Day,5 which found a similar immunity
for the states from federal taxation, forbids the taxation of one government by the
other where the imposition of the tax would tend to interfere with a governmental
function of the former. The cases dealing with the immunity are so numerous, and
the doctrine has so many refinements,4 that its development cannot be retraced in
detail within the confines of a brief article. Broadly stated, the law is settled.that
immunity exists only when the government is acting in a governmental, as opposed
to a proprietary, capacity. In addition, where the tax is not imposed directly upon
the state or federal sovereign, it must be shown that the burden of the tax will be
passed along to the government.
In order to sustain a tax on the interest from governmental securities it would
seem, then, to be necessary to find that the issuance of securities is not a governmental
SAB., 1938, Duke University. Member of the third-year class, Duke Univ. School of Law. Member,
editorial board, Duke Bar Adon lournal.The question of the constitutionality of such a tax cannot be raised under existing tax laws. Federal
statutes, state constitutions, statutes and regulations forbid the taxation of the interest of the securities
issued by the other government.
'U. S. DEPT op JusrcE TA xotT0 op Go x-esrRlT Bo.inoz.r AD Etps'.omy (1938).
'Report to the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Power of Congress to Tax the Interest
from State and Local Securities and the C-7mpensalionx of State and Local Employees (1939).
'4 Wheat. 36 (U. S. 1819)- 11 Wall. 113 (U.S. 187o).
* See the works cited supra, notes 2 and 3. For shorter treatments see Wenchell, Federd.-Ste Re-
ciprocal Taxation of Income from Public Securities (1939) 17 TAXEs 507, and Brown, Intergovernmenid
Tax Immunity: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment? (1940) 25 WASI. L Rxv. 153.
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function, or, that the taxation of the interest from such securities would not unduly
burden the borrowing sovereign. There is little doubt that the issuance of securities
is a governmental function. This has been traditionally assumed with respect to the
states,7 and Mr. Justice Stone, in Graves v. O'Keefe,' said that every enterprise in
which the federal government could constitutionally participate is governmental in
nature.
The most compelling argument against the taxation of the interest from tax-
exempt bonds is that the imposition of the tax would place a real burden on the
issuing government. Since the legal incidence of the income tax is upon the indi-
vidual bondholder, unless he shifts the burden of the tax along to the government,
the argument that the tax interferes with a governmental function must fail. But it
has been assumed that the burden would be shifted, and that the government would
be forced to pay higher interest rates.
From a legal point of view, the most serious obstacle to such a tax may be the
famous Pollock case.' That case, which declared invalid the income tax law of 893,
is one of the most disputed decisions of American law. It apparently held three
things: (z) that, for the purpose of deciding whether an income tax is a direct tax
within the meaning of the Constitution, the source of the income must be looked to;
(2) that a tax upon the income from real or personal property is a direct tax and has to
be apportioned, while a tax on the income from a business or profession is an excise
tax and does not have to be apportioned; and (3) that a tax on the interest from state
and municipal bonds is invalid. Whether the tax as to interest from bonds was held
bad because it was direct and not apportioned or because it was considered a burden
on the power of the state to borrow has never been agreed upon. Acceptance of the
former view would mean, of course, that the defect was cured by the adoption of the
i6th Amendment. However, a very persuasive argument is made that, although four
justices dissented from the view that a tax on the income from personal property was
invalid because direct, yet the Court unanimously agreed on the invalidity of the tax
on the interest from state bonds, and, therefore, the ground of decision on the latter
point must have been the effect of the tax as a clog on the power of the government
to borrow.
But conceding, as must be done in the light of language in subsequent decisions,
that the tax on interest was held bad because it interfered with the borrowing power
of the state,c 0 it is not at all sure that the present Court would reaffirm that view.
' However, conceivably, a state might not be acting in a governmental capacity when it issues bonds
for a proprietary purpose. For instance, the taxation of bonds issued by the state for the purpose of
running a liquor store might not involve exactly the same questions as the taxation of a bond issued for
the purpose of constructing a courthouse. But, if the tax on income from bonds issued for the former
purpose increased the interest rate required, the fiscal effect on the issuing government would seem the
same as if the tax had been imposed on income from bonds issued for the latter purpose.
306 U. S. 466 (x939).
'Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., z58 U. S. 6oz (x895).
' The tax could have been held bad because it was a direct burden on the state, or because it was
shifted from the taxpayer to the state. Taken literally, the Pollock case seems to hold that an income
=x is a direct tax on the source of the income, hence that the tax was the same as a tax on the bonds
themselves, which would admittedly be bad. But that the Pollock case has not been followed literally is
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Decisions in two related fields have made reasonable the questioning of the force of
the Pollock case today. It was held in Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp?1 that
the income of a government lessee could be taxed. A federal income tax on the
salary'of an employee of the New York Port Authority, a state agency, was sustained
in Helvering v. Gerhardt,12 and a state tax on the salary of an officer of the Home
Owners Loan Corporation, a federal agency, was upheld in Graves V. O'Keefe.3
These cases, on which are based the chief hopes of the advocates of the President's
proposal, do indicate a new trend in the Court's attitude toward the doctrine of
intergovernmental immunities. Whereas it was formerly presumed that the burden
imposed on a governmental lessee or a governmental employee would be passed
along to the government, the Court has now indicated that it will examine the
particular case to see if the burden actually is shifted. It seems to be required now
.that it be affirmatively shown that the burden of the tax will be shifted from the
individual taxpayer to the government. The fact that the Court found no proof that
'the burden of the tax had been shifted in the above cases does not preclude the
possibility that it will find that a shifting in the case of taxation of interest from
government bonds. But the cases do demonstrate that the Court will actually ex-
amine the situation and will no longer assume, without proof, that the tax will be'
shifted. While there is better evidence that the tax on interest is shifted to the bor-
rower than that the tax on an employee is shifted to the employer, whether there is
enough evidence to satisfy the Court that an immunity should be accorded is purely
speculative. The economic arguments on both sides are presented in the preceding
articles and need not be repeated here.
The President's proposal conceives of a waiver of whatever right to immunity
the federal bonds have. That such a waiver would be valid is quite clear.' 4 In the
absence of such a waiver a federal tax might succeed where a state tax would fail.
It was pointed out in Helvering v. Gerhardt that the immunities of the two govern-
ments are not identical; that the federal government is entitled to greater protection
through immunity than is the state. This distinction is apparent in at least two forms.
First, all functions of the federal government are governmental in nature, while the
state may engage in a proprietary function. It is doubtful, as has been seen, whether
evidenced by Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165 (x9x8), which sustained a tax on profits derived from
an exporting business, although the business itself could not have been taxed. New York ex rel. Cohn v.
Graves, 300 U. S. 308 (1937), upheld a New York income tax on income derived from property outside
the state. It was there pointed out that the Pollock case decided only that the income tax was so similar
to a direct tax, when the question was whether apportionment would be required, that it would have to
be apportioned. That view was reaffirmed in Hale v. State Board of Assessment, 302 U. S. 95 (1937),
which indicated that, apart from the question of apportionment, the income tax might reasonably be
regarded as an excise. It follows from these decisions that an income tax on the interest from bonds is
not a direct tax on the bonds themselves, and that an immunity will be required only if the burden
initially on the bondholder is passed along to the government.
21 303 U. S. 376 (1937).
22304 U. S. 405 (1938). . 1 Supra note 7.
"' Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wall. 573 (1865); Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 297 U. S. 209 (936). And see Mr. Justice Roberts, dissenting, in James v. Dravo Contracting Co.
302 U. S. 134, x81 (1937) where he admits, "No one denies the competence of Congress to waive the
immunity in whole or in[ part."
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this distinction is pertinent in the case of issuance of securities. Secondly, the fedcral
government has the power to immunize its agencies, 15 while the state apparently has
no corresponding power. In the absdnce of any expression of Congressional intent,
however, the immunity to be afforded interest from federal bonds would be one of
implication, and would stand on a parity with the immunity afforded interest from
state bonds. 6
II. THE EFFEcT OF THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT
There is another ground on which the immunity now given interest from gov-
ernmental securities might be removed. The 16th Amendment gives Congress the
power to tax income "from whatever source derived" without the necessity of
apportionment. The conventional view, and the one to which the Court has adhered,17
is that the Amendment gave Congress no new power to tax but merely relieved it
from the duty of apportioning a tax on the income from real and personal property-
a task which, as has been pointed out, was imposed by the Pollock case.
It is argued by Mr. Justice Black, in his concurring dpinion in Helvering v. Ger-
hardt,18 that the words "from whatever source derived" should be given their full
force and meaning, and that Congress should be empowered to tax any income with-
- out regard to its source. This contention is based on the theory that the 16th Amend-'
ment was passed to overcome the effect of the Pollock case and, since that case held
invalid a tax on the interest from state bonds, the Amendmentwas meant to correct
that holding of the case-also. Fortifying Mr. Justice Black's position is a mass of
material presented by the Department of Justice,19 tending, so the Department
claims, to show that it was generally believed at the time of ratification that the
Amendment would authorize the taxation of the interest from tax-exempt bonds.
While such an argument is not irrelevant, it may be attacked as proving too much,
for under such an interpretation the income of the state government itself could be
taxed, regardless ot the burden imposed. Another objection to such a view is that it
is inapplicable to the states, and would not give them an equal opportunity to tax.
It seems unlikely, in view of its steadfast holdings to the contrary, that the Court will
now re-examine the evidence and construe the 16th Amendment to give Congress
the power to tax all income, with no regard to sour&.
III. CouNrMr. PaoPosALS
Several suggestions have been put forward which would reach the same result
as outright taxation -of interest from governmental securities, or which would tend
to alleviate some of the alleged unfairnesses of the present system. One writer sug-
gests that the tax law be amended so that the tax becomes an "excise on the act and
"
5 Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 15 (1939).
1' Since the immunities of the two governments are not identicil, whether the states adopt the
proposed tax policy apparently has no bearing on the validity of the proposed federal tax.
"7 Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. I., 240 U. S. I (xg6). See Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. x65, x72
(1918); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 521 (1926).
18304 U. S. 405, 424 (1938)-
19 This material is summarized in U. S. DEP'T op JUSTICE, op. cit., supra note 2, Pt. H.
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transaction of receiving income, measured by the net income received." 20 In other
words, he proposes to tax the receipt of income, the tax to be measured by the amount
of income, including that which is tax-exempt as well as that which is taxable. This
plan, as applied to corporations, was sustained in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co?1
From a practical standpoint, the plan has several points in its favor.. It could be
applied by the states as well as the federal government. And it could be applied
retroactively. Direct taxation of the interest, as proposed by the President, wovld
result in a huge unearned bounty to the present holders of exempt securities unless
the tax were imposed retroactively? 2 The imposition of the tax on the interest from
outstanding securities would run into the problem of due process. The taxation of
future interest of outstanding governmental securities would not be invalidated by
the clause of the Constitution forbidding the impairment of contracts,2" for that
applies only to the issuing government, but the tax might well be held so arbitrary
and unreasonable as to constitute a violation of due process clause. That whole
problem would be avoided by imposing an excise tax on the act of receiving income,
the tax to be measured by the income.
But the plan is objectionable in that it resorts to a distinction which is of only
verbal significance. In result, there is no practical difference between an income tax
imposed directly on the interest from governmental -bonds and a tax on some
privilege when the tax is measured by the same interest. The burden on the borrow-
ing government would seem to be the same in either case.
It is true that the distinction between subject and measure has been upheld in
the cases of a franchise tax,24 a tax on the transfer of bonds, 25 and a tax on profits
from their resale.28 But in all those cases there was a recognized legal privilege
which justified the distinction. The right to incorporate, the right to transfer prop-
erty upon death, and the right to resell bonds are all privileges accorded by the
law. It is by no means clear that there is even a legalistic distinction between the
ordinary income tax and a tax on the privilege of receiving income measured by the
income m7
Two other plans have been advanced which utilize another distinction-that
between subject and rate. As early as i919 Senator Carter Glass suggested that tax
exempt income be used to determine the rate to be applied to the taxable income.
" Shultz, Tax Exemptions of Governmental Secuties (1939) 17 TAXES 331-
2L220 U. S. 107 (1911). A state franchise tax measured by exempt federal securities was upheld in
Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 258 U. S. 48Q (1932).
" It is insisted by the Department of justice that the tax would be applied only prospectively.
21U. S. CONsr. Art. I, S o. "Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., supra note 21.
" Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U. S. 384 (1922). Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 2x6 (1g3r).
27 it is not certain, in the light of the Hale case, supra note xo, that the income tax is not now regarded
as an excise tax. In that case an Iowa income tax imposed upon the interest of bonds issued tax free by
Iowa was sustained. The tax was upheld on the grounds that the exemption related only to property
taxes and that, for the purpose of deciding whether the imposition of an income tax would impair the
state's contract not to tax the bonds, the income tax was reasonably regarded as as excise. The Pollock
case was distinguished on the same grounds as it was in the Cohn case, supra note io. Since the tax
was imposed by the same state which issued the bonds no question of burden was involved, but it is not
inconceivable that the Court would hold that, for the purpose of determining burden, the income tax
was an excse.
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This plan has been recently advocated by Mr. Roswell Magill while Under Secretary
of the Treasury,28 and has been championed, in modified form, by Professor C. L.
B. Lowndes. -9 The Treasury plan, in brief, is to allocate exempt income to the
lowest surtax bracket, rather than the highest, for the purpose of determining the
rate of tax. A simple example will help. Assume a taxing statute under which in-
come up to $5oooo is taxed at 1o%, and all over that amount at 2oo. T, a taxpayer,
has a net income of $Soo,ooo, half of which comes from governmental -securities.
Under the existing income tax T's exempt income is entirely excluded from computa-
tion, with the result that his taxable income of $5o,ooo falls into the lower bracket,
producing a tax liability of $5,ooo. The exempt income is, in effect, allocated to the
higher bracket, then disregarded. Under the Treasury plan, T's entire income, in-
cluding that which is tax-exempt, would be considered to establish the rate. The
exempt income is allocated to the lower bracket, which pushes the taxable income
into the higher bracket. Once the rate is determined, the exempt income is with-
drawn, leaving the taxable income suspended in the higher bracket. In the example,
T's income would be pushed into the higher bracket, and the tax rate of 20% would
attach. His tax liability, then, would be $io,ooo.
The alternative plan, suggested by Professor Lowndes, would distribute the
exempt income in all the brackets rather than place it arbitrarily in the lowest bracket.
In the hypothetical case, for instance, half of T's taxable income would be allocated
to the io% bracket and half to the 2o% bracket. As a result, his taxable income
would be taxed at the average rate of tax for a taxable income of the same size as his
total income. The specific mechanics of computing such a tax would be to ascertain
the tax which would be assessed on T's entire income, were it all taxable. That part
of the tax which is proportionate to the part of his income which is taxable would
be paid to the government. In the illustration, the tax upon an income of $Ioo,ooo
would be $15,000. Since half of T's income is taxable, he would pay half this sum, or
$7,500.
The obvious objection to these plans is that they tax indirectly what it is assumed
cannot be taxed directly. The language of Mr. Justice McReynolds, in National Life
Insurance Co. v. United States, ° looks ominous: "One may not be subjected to a
greater tax burden on his taxable property because he owns some that is free." But
that passage loses some of its force when it is remembered that the same justice later
upheld a tax which provided that interest paid on an indebtedness incurred to
purchase or carry tax exempt bonds was not deductible, although all other interest
payments. were deductible.sl The tax was upheld on the grounds that the provision
was "to prevent the escape from taxation of income properly subject thereto by the
purchase of exempt securities with borrowed money." It is arguable that the Treas-
"Magill, The Problem of Intergovernmental Tax Exemption (1937) 15 TAx MAG;AZINE 699.
"Lowndes, Taxing the Income from Tax Exempt Securities (1938) 32 IL. L. REv. 643; Lowndes,
The Federal Income Tax and Interest from State and Municipal Bonds (1938) 3 LEGAL Nam$ ON LocAL
GOVERNMENT 345.
302 77 U. S. 5o8, 519 (1928). "Denman v. Slayton, 282 U. S. 514 (193).
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ury plan increases the tax burden only to the extent that it is necessary to prevent
undue escape from taxation.8 2
There are two cases in the field of jurisdiction to tax which may have some
bearing of the validity of these proposals. Maxwell v. Bugbee3 3 upheld a New Jersey
.inheritance tax computed upon the entire estate of the decedent, including property
outside the state and not subject to its jurisdiction. The part of the tax which was
proportionate to the New Jersey share of the entire estate was paid to the state. The
mechanics were essentially the same as those suggested by Professor Lowndes.
Authority for the Treasury proposal is found in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Grosiean,3 4 sustaining the Louisiana chain store tax which fixed the rate of tax on
stores within the state, not by the number of stores within the state; but by the total
number in the chain, both within and without Louisiana.
While it is true that these decisions are not direct authority for the inclusion of
tax exempt interest for the purpose of computing rate, because they are in the field
of jurisdiction to tax, there is reason for believing that the reasoning is equally
applicable to tax exemptions. The Supreme Court has held, in connection with juris-
diction to tax, that extra-territorial property cannot be included in the measure of a
death 35 or franchise tax, 6 while upholding death taxes *measured by exempt securi-
ties" and franchise taxes measured by net income from Such sources. 88 This would"
lead to the conclusion that the policy against extra-territoriality is stronger than the
policy against taxing tax-exempt securities. It may follow, then, 'that since the rate
of tax can be determined by extra-territorial property, it can be determined by exempt
securities,
Unless justified by some economic consideration, this distinction between subject
and rate should be criticized on the same grounds as the distinction between subject
and measure. That the Supreme Court is concerned with economic considerations is
evidenced by the fact that, while the latter distinction has been upheld in the cases
noted above, it has been rejected in others.S*
In this connection, there should be considered the potential advantages of the
Treasury proposal arising from the fact that governmental securities could still be
sold at low interest rates since they would be just as attractive to big corporate buyers
whose tax rates are not sharply progressive. The system of measuring the rate of tax
by exempt securities would not affect a taxpayer who did not pay a progressive tax.
And since a large proportion of governmental securities are held by corporations
which pay a flat tax, the governmental issues could still compete effectively in the
money market. This would meet one of the major oljections to the imposition of
an outright tax on the interest.
" A taxpayer's average rate of tax is lowered if he owns tax exempt securities. To prevent tax
evasion through lowered rates, the exempt interest might reasonably be included to fix the rate.
"250 U. S. 525 (x919). at301 U. S. 412 (x937).
"'Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
:" Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
'Greiner v. Lewellyn, supra note 25. " Willcutts v. Bunn, supra note 26.
"' Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U. S. 136 (1927); Macallen Co. v. Mass.,
279 U. S. 62o (1929).
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At the same time, the plan would do much to eradicate the unfairness of the
present system with regard to individuals, and the divergence from the ability to
pay theory which arises when the tax exemption may mean a saving of 79% to one
taxpayer and only 4% to another. Whether such rise in interest rates as might be
expected from the fact that individuals do purchase governmental bonds could be
offset by the increased revenues is, of course, conjectural. Finally, this plan would
remove the legal objection to applying the direct tax retroactively and thereby elim-
inate the unearned increment which would result to the holders of governmental
securities if the direct tax were applied only prospectively.
From a practical standpoint, an objection to the plan would lie in the fact that
the states, with their low income tax rates, could not use it to advantage. Moreover,
the plan would not be as productive in revenue, even for the federal government, as
direct taxation.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND INTERSTATE COMPACT
The short answer to all doubts as to the constitutionality of taxing the interest
from governmental securities would be the adoption of a Constitutional amendment.
But the delay and the practical difficulties which would be encountered in securing
ratification discourage such a step. An amendment requires ratification by three
fourths of the states, and since the states would risk revenue losses by its adoption, it
is exceedingly doubtful whether the requisite number would approve it.40
Another proposal is that the federal government and all the states sign a mutual
pact, each permitting the other to tax such interest. Such a plan would be practically
impossible to carry out. Absolute mutuality could not be achieved until the sixteen
states which do not have income tax laws at the present time enacted them. It would
then be necessary that every state sign the agreement, a requirement more rigorous
than that for the passage of a Constitutional amendment, and just that much harder
to achieve.
SThat this fear is not unfounded is proved by the fact that the governors of all the states and the
mayors of the principal cities in the country have banded together to fight any scheme which might
result in the taxation of the interest from state and local securities. See Betters, The Proposal to Tax
Income'from Governmevtal Securities: 11. The Case Against Taxation, supra, at p. 222.
